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The modern version of the United States internship system has 
changed over the years. It is believed internships descended from 
professional apprenticeships, which originated with the trade guilds of 
Europe in the eleventh and twelfth century.1 In the trade guilds, a 
person would pay to work alongside a “master,” who would teach him 
a skill.2 Apprentices could spend several years working alongside their 
“master,” and typically started their training at the age of sixteen.3 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2018, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. 
1 Isaac J. Spradlin, The Evolution of Interns, FORBES (April 27, 2009), 
https://www.forbes.com/2009/04/27/intern-history-apprenticeship-leadership 
-careers-jobs.html (last accessed Oct. 1, 2017). 
2Meaghan Haire and Kristi Oloffson, Interns, TIME MAGAZINE (July 30, 2009), 
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1913474,00.html (last accessed 
Oct. 1, 2017). 
3 Id. 
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Internships are recognized as a necessary experience for career 
development.4 Over time, they became an integral part of a person’s 
education and are sometimes required to earn a college degree.5 In 
today’s economy, many employers consider internship experience as 
one of the most significant factors in hiring decisions.6 However, if an 
intern is not considered an employee by law, they are not afforded the 
same protections under Title VII or the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”).7 Under the FLSA, employees are guaranteed a minimum 
wage for their work, but the Act does not provide a clear definition of 
the term “employee.”8 In addition, lack of Title VII protection exposes 
interns to discrimination and hostile work environments, such as 
sexual harassment.9  
Recently, there was been an increase in litigation involving 
unpaid internships.10 Unpaid interns argue that employers cannot 
avoid FLSA requirements simply by labeling employees as interns, 
contending that interns should be considered employees only when 
they successfully show an employer-employee relationship.11 
                                                 
4 Spradlin, supra note 1. 
5 Robert J. Tepper & Matthew P. Holt, Unpaid Internships: Free Labor or 
Valuable Learning Experience?, 2015 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 323 (2015). 
6 Human resources professionals recently ranked internship experience as one 
of the most important factors when hiring an applicant. See Joanna Venator & 
Richard V. Reeeves, Unpaid Internships: Support Beams for the Glass Floor, 
Bookings Inst. (July 7, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/social-mobility-
memos/2015/07/07/unpaid-internships-support-beams-for-the-glass-floor/ 
7 See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947) (establishing 
the trainee exception under the FLSA). 
8 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)–(2) (2013). 
9 See Wang v. Phoenix Satellite Television US, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 527, 529 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that an intern was not protected under Title VII although 
she was sexually harassed at her internship site).  
10 See Ross Perlin, Unpaid Interns: Silent No More, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/jobs/unpaid-interns-silent-no-more.html 
(stating that over 15 unpaid internship lawsuits have been filed since summer of 
2013). 
11 See Matthew H. Nelson, Internship and Federal Law: Are Interns 
Employees?, EMPLOYEE RELATIONS L.J. 36 (2010).  
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Currently, there is no federally regulated definition of “intern.”12 The 
Supreme Court attempted to shed light on the subject in Walling v. 
Portland Terminal Co.,13 which provided guidance on how courts 
should determine the circumstances when an unpaid trainee may be 
considered an employee under the FLSA. Since that decision, the U.S 
Department of Labor14 (“DOL”) and various circuit courts have 
attempted to interpret the Walling factors as applied to modern day 
internship programs. As a result, four predominant tests have 
emerged:15 The Wage & Hour Division (“WHD”) factors,16 the 
“primary beneficiary” test,17 “the totality of the circumstances” test,18 
and the Glatt test.19  
Most recently, the Seventh Circuit analyzed this issue in Hollins v. 
Regency Corp.20 In Hollins, the Seventh Circuit held that cosmetology 
students, whom worked in a salon for school credit, were not 
employees covered by the FLSA.21 As a result, those students were 
                                                 
12 See Louis C. LaBrecque, Bills Would Bar Bias Against Unpaid Interns by 
Government, Congress and Private Sector, [2015] DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 144, 
at A-8 (July 28, 2015) (reporting on the recent introduction of the Unpaid Intern 
Protection Act, which defines “intern” and, if enacted, would protect interns from 
“workplace harassment and discrimination” in the private sector, as well as at state 
and local government levels). 
13 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947).  
14 In 2010, The U.S Department of Labor, Wage & Hour Division released Fact 
Sheet #71, a six-factor test to help differentiate an employee from an unpaid intern. 
Wage & Hour Div., Fact Sheet #71: Internship Programs Under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (2010), 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.pdf. 
15 All the four tests will be discussed in Section II of this note. 
16 U.S Dep’t of Labor, Fact Sheet #71, supra note 14. 
17 See, e.g., McLaughing v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1989).  
18 See, e.g., Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1993); 
Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267 (5th Circ. 1982). 
19 See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 803 F.3d 1199, 1212 (2d Cir. 
2015).  
20 867 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 2017). 
21 Id.  
3
: Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Are they Trainees and Not Employees a
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017




not entitled to compensation for the time they worked in the salon.22 
The court also discussed the various established tests that have 
emerged from other circuits that have grappled with the distinction 
between an employee and an unpaid intern/trainee. It ultimately 
decided on a combination of the relevant tests, which it called the 
“economic reality test.”23  
This note unfolds in five parts. Part I gives a brief overview of the 
FLSA and the federal government’s involvement in trying to define 
the FLSA’s self-defining “employee” definition. Part II focuses on the 
different tests employed by the DOL and circuit courts across the 
nation when attempting to determine who constitutes an employee 
under the FLSA. Part III analyzes the recent Seventh Circuit decision 
of Hollins v. Regency Corp. and discusses the court’s hesitation to 
articulate a specific and definitive test to apply in cases in which it is 
necessary to first determine whether an employer is properly 
classifying employees as “interns” or “trainees,” or if those persons 
should be deemed “employees” by law. Part IV looks at the dangers 
unpaid interns face when they are not considered employees, 
specifically focusing on the issues that arise under Title VII in the 
context of sexual harassment in the workplace. Finally, Part V 
advocates for a clear, universal, two-question test to determine 
whether unpaid interns should be considered employees under the 
FLSA.  
 
I. THE FLSA AND ITS SELF-DEFINING EMPLOYEE DEFINITION  
 
A. Brief Overview of the FLSA 
 
 The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) was enacted on June 
25, 1938.24 The FLSA requires that all nonexempt employees25 receive 
                                                 
22 Id.  
23 Id. 
24 Willis J. Nordlund, A Brief History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 39 Lab. 
L. J. 715, 718, 720–21 (1988).  
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minimum wage and overtime pay.26 It sets a minimum wage of $.25 
per hour (rising to $0.40/hr by 1945), fixed the maximum work hours 
to 44 (falling to 40 hr/week by 1940), and banned child labor.27 This 
act was part of a strong push, led by President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt,28 for government control over the hours and wages of all 
workers, specifically those of children.29 
When Congress enacted the FLSA, it declared that the “labor 
conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of 
living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of 
workers”30 created burdens and perils to the labor markets and 
interstate commerce.31 Thus, Congress believed enacting the FLSA 
and creating a federal minimum wage requirement improved a 
worker’s quality of life.32 
 Section 6(a) of the FLSA established the federal minimum rate 
employers must pay their employees.33 The minimum wage 
requirement applies to every employment relationship that falls under 
                                                                                                                   
25 Employees are considered Non-Exempt when they are primarily performing 
work that is subject to the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act and 
overtime pay is required. Dep't. of Human Res., FLSA Non-Exempt and Expect 
Defined, UNIV. OF MINN., https://humanresources.umn.edu/compensation-and-
classification/flsa-exempt-nonexempt-defined (last visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
26 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C §201, et seq.  
27 Duncan Farthing-Nichol, Social Mobility in the New Economy: 
Transforming Unpaid Internships through an Educational Inquiry Test DIGITAL 
ACCESS TO SCHOLARSHIP AT HARVARD (April 2014), 
https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/12921732.  
28 The Act also had social implication due to the Great Depression. John 
Hardman, The Great Depression and the New Deal, ETHICS OF DEV. IN A GLOBAL 
ENV’T. (July 26, 1999) 
https://web.stanford.edu/class/e297c/poverty_prejudice/soc_sec/hgreat.htm (last 
accessed Dec. 1, 2017).  
29 Nordlund, Supra. Note 24. 
30 FLSA §2, 29 U.S.C § 202.  
31 Id.  
32 See 29 U.S.C §206. 
33 FLSA 6(a), 29 U.S.C § 206. 
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the FLSA’s definition of “employee.”34 However, the FLSA broadly 
defines “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer” and 
defines “employed” as “to suffer or permit to work.” An employer, in 
turn, “includes any person acting . . . in the interest of an employer in 
relation to an employee.” 
 These definitions allow for broad interpretations and lead to 
uncertainty as to when interns are employees under the FLSA.35 
Nevertheless, the courts have found it proper to reduce the breath of 
the definitions by carving out certain exceptions. One of those 
exceptions was established in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., as the 
“trainee” exception,36 which has formed the basis of unpaid intern law. 
Further, if an unpaid intern is found to be an employee then the FLSA 
standards apply,37 and the employer is forced by the DOL to pay that 
intern the federal minimum wage and any overtime compensation.38 
 
C. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., The Supreme Court’s Attempt to 
Differentiate Employees from Unpaid Trainees  
 
The Supreme Court has yet to decide if unpaid interns are 
considered employees under the FLSA, but it has provided some 
guidance for courts grappling with cases brought by unpaid trainees.39 
In Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.,40 the Supreme Court carved out a 
                                                 
34 29 U.S.C § 203(e)(1)–(5). 
35 See generally, David C. Yamada, The Employment Law Rights of Student 
Interns, 35 CONN. L. REV. 215, 218–19 (2002). 
36 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947). 
37 Note that there are certain State Law wage and hour protections that can 
possibly protect interns. Wage and Hour Div., State Labor Laws, U.S DEP’T OF 
LABOR https://www.dol.gov/whd/state/state.htm (last accessed Dec. 1, 2017). 
38 See Enforcement Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, U.S. DEP'T OF 
LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/elaws/esa/flsa/screen74.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2017). 
The DOL has a specific Wage and Hour Division that “enforces the FLSA for 
employees.” Id. 
39 See Walling, 330 U.S. at 152. 
40 Id. 
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specific “trainee” exception under the FLSA.41 Portland Terminal was 
a railroad company that offered a course of practical training to 
prospective yard brakemen.42 The training was a necessary requisite; 
brakemen applicants were never accepted until they had taken the 
training course.43 However, the company did not pay the individuals 
for their training time.44 Thus, the plaintiff, a brakeman, argued he was 
an employee under the FLSA and was entitled to compensation for the 
time he spent in the training program.45  
The Portland Terminal training course consisted of working under 
the supervision of a yard crew.46 The trainee would first observe and 
then was gradually permitted to do actual work under close scrutiny 
and supervision.47 The Court noted there was “no question” that the 
trainees were doing the type of activities covered by the FLSA.48 
However, the Court also stated that it would not interpret the FLSA to 
create an employment relationship when a person’s work was intended 
to serve only his or her own advantage, stating,  
 
 broad as [the definitions of employer and employee are], 
they cannot be interpreted so as to make a person whose 
work serves only his own interest an employee of another 
person who gives him aid and instruction. Had these 
trainees taken courses in railroading in a public or private 
vocational school, wholly disassociated from the railroad, 
it could not reasonably be suggested that they were 
employees of the school within the meaning of the Act.49  
                                                 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 149. 
43 Id.  




48 Id.  
49 Id. at 152–153. The Court also claimed that the FLSA “[did not] intended to 
stamp all persons as employees, who, without any express or implied compensation 
7
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The Court ultimately held that the plaintiff was a trainee of the 
company and, therefore, did not fall within the FLSA’s definition of 
“employee.”50 In support of its holding, the Court looked to the intent 
of the legislature when enacting the statute.51 The Court noted that the 
FLSA’s purpose “was to ensure that every person whose employment 
contemplated compensation should not be compelled to sell his 
services for less than prescribed minimum wage.”52  
 The Court also noted several factors and observations which 
helped it determine the trainee was not an employee.53 First, the Court 
noted the trainees’ work did not “displace” any of the company’s 
regular employees.54 Second, the Court looked at the fact that the 
trainees’ work was closely supervised, such that the “work [the 
trainees did] did not expedite the company’s business, but may [have] . 
. . actually impede[d] . . . it.”55 The Court further noted the importance 
of the training program in the trainee’s subsequent employment with 
the company.56 In addition, the Court also relied on the trainee’s lack 
of a guaranteed job following the completion of the program, and the 
trainee’s lack of expectation of compensation.57 Finally, the Supreme 
Court considered the educational benefit of Portland’s training course, 
as well as the instructional benefit for the trainee.58 Based on all of its 
observations, the Court determined Portland received “no immediate 
                                                                                                                   
agreement, might work for their own advantage on the premises on another.” Id. at 
152  
50 Id. at 153.  
51 Id. at 152. 
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 153.  
54 Id. at 149–50.  
55 Id. at 150. 
56 Id. at 149–50. However, subsequent employment with the railroad company 
was not guaranteed upon completion of the training program. After the individuals 
completed the program they were then placed into a pool of people that the railroad 
could hire from when necessary. Id.  
57 Id. at 150.  
58 Id. at 152–53.  
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advantage”59 from the trainees work, thus concluding the plaintiff was 
not an employee within the meaning of the FLSA.60 
 
D. The Department of Labor’s, Wage & Hour Division Six-Factor Test  
 
 In the aftermath of Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.,61 employers 
were faced with the question of whether the workers fell under the 
“trainee exception” or whether an employment relationship existed 
with their trainees.62 To provide a more direct approach and 
interpretation of Wailing, the Department of Labor, under their Wage 
& Hour Division (“WHD”), devised a six-factor test.63 In April 2010, 
the DOL under WHD released these factors on Fact Sheet #71: 
Internship Programs Under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 64  
The WHD determined that for an employment relationship not to 
exist and federal protections to apply, all of the following factors must 
be met: (1) the internship, even though it includes actual operation of 
the facilities of the employer, is similar to training which would be 
given in an educational environment;65 (2) the internship experience is 
for the benefit of the intern;66 (3) the intern does not displace regular 
employees but works under close supervision of existing staff;67 (4) 
the employer that provides the training derives no immediate 
advantage from the activities of the intern; and on occasion its 
                                                 
59 Id. at 153.  
60 Id.  
61 Id. 
62 Elyse Brookhouser, Whaling on Walling: A Uniform Approach to 
Determining Whether Interns are “Employees” Under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, 100 IOWA L. REV. 751, 756 (2015). 
63 Wage & Hour Div., , Fact Sheet #71: Internships Under the Fair Labor 
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operations may actually be impeded;68 (5) the intern is not necessarily 
entitled to a job at the conclusion of the internship;69 and (6) the 
employer and the intern understand that the intern is not entitled to 
wages for the time spent in the internship.70 The WHD concluded that 
“[i]f all of the factors listed above are met, an employment relationship 
does not exist under the FLSA, and the [FLSA’s] minimum wage and 
overtime provisions do not apply to the intern.”71 
Although the DOL and WHD published this test as a Fact Sheet, 
they are opinion letters, and many courts have taken it upon 
themselves to interpret the Walling case and to develop their own 
factors.72 Fact sheets from the DOL do not hold the necessary force of 
law to bind the courts.73 Thus, all the DOL can do is strongly 
encourage that its test be followed, and that the courts give deference 
to its opinion.74 The WHD explained that the more an internship 
program resembles an educational experience and offers an 
                                                 




72 See discussion in Section II.  
73 See Wage & Hour Div., supra note 63 (“This publication is for general 
information and is not to be considered in the same light as official statements of 
position contained in the regulations”); see also Matthew Tripp, Note, In the Defense 
of Unpaid Internships: Proposing a workable test for Eliminating Illegal 
Internships, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 341, 354-66 (2015) (noting that some courts have 
denied the DOL fact sheet any deference, as it is subject to much criticism for its 
inconsistency with prior DOL interpretations). 
74 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (stating that “the 
rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not 
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of 
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort 
for guidance”). Furthermore, courts have also disagreed about the level of deference 
to give the DOL Fact Sheet. Compare Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 
642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2011) (stating that the DOL Fact Sheet #71 should not 
be given deference under Skidmore), with some courts giving agency opinions great 
deference according to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (creating a two-step test that affords deference to 
Congress if it has spoken directly to the issue in question). 
10
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educational benefit, the more likely the unpaid internship will fit into 
the “trainee exception.”75  
 
1. The Issue with the DOL Factors 
 
 Even though Fact Sheet #71 is not federally enforced, many 
jurisdictions have used the DOL’s six-factor test.76 Employers have 
also tried to navigate the landscape of internships by relying on the 
WHD’s educational benefit rationale.77 However, a key issue arises 
when employers follow the DOL factors and exploit the education 
benefit concept.78  
 The issue is the test heavily focuses on student opportunities and 
class credit.79 Nevertheless, a growing number of interns in this 
country are no longer college students.80 Recently there has been a 
growing number of post-graduate and “career-changers” that have 
                                                 
75 See Wage & Hour Div., supra note 63. 
76 See Diana Shaginian, Note, Unpaid Internships in the Entertainment 
Industry: The need for a Clear and Practical Intern Standard After the Black Swan 
Lawsuit, 21 SW. J. INT’L L. 509, 516 (2015).  
77 See Dana Schuster v. Kirsten Fleming, Conde Nast Intern: “I Cried Myself 
to Sleep,” N.Y POST (Nov. 21, 2013, 6:36 AM), 
http://nypost.com/2013/11/21/conde-nast-interns-speak-out-on-program-shutdown/.  
78 Such as in Hollins v. Regency Corp., where the court states one of the 
reasons that cosmetology interns are not employees is because they are getting 
educational credit to fulfill their certificate, which can be a type of compensation. 
144 F.Supp.3d 990, 993 (2015). However, what happens to those students who are 
not aiming to get a certificate, they would not be working for certificate hours, so 
what would be their type of compensation? 
79 See Wage & Hour Div.  Fact Sheet #71: Internships Under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, U.S DEP’T OF LABOR (2010), 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.pdf. 
80 See Amy Levin-Epstein, Why Internships Aren’t Just for College Students, 
CBS NEWS (Apr. 4, 2011), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-internships-arent-
just-for-college-students/ (noting that there has been an increase in numbers of 
individuals searching for internships that are recent graduates or older: “We have 
noticed that 20 percent of the people searching … for internships are either recent 
graduates or older. So, it's clear that internship seekers are no longer undergrads 
alone”).  
11
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sought internships in today’s markets.81 Thus, when more and more 
employers require interns to be eligible to receive college credit as a 
pre-requisite for their internship program, the employer excludes those 
post-graduates and “career-changers”.82 A system is needed that 
addresses the growing number of individuals seeking unpaid 
internships,83 shifting the focus from educational benefit and focusing 
on the benefit the intern brings to the employer.84 
 
II. THE DIFFERENT CIRCUIT COURT APPROACHES  
 
Recently, the courts have had an influx of individuals challenging 
their unpaid intern status. Numerous circuit courts have had to address 
whether various working relationships rise to a level of an employee-
employer relationship under the FLSA. While the DOL offered a six-
factor test, circuit courts, when faced with the question of determining 
an intern’s employment relationship, have applied and adopted various 
tests based on their individual interpretations of the Walling decision 
and the DOL’s six-factor test.85 
                                                 
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
83 While Interns may seek paid internships, the number is limited, which is 
why many Interns end up in unpaid and often illegal internships. See Avik Roy, The 
Unhappy Rise of The Millennial Intern, FORBES (Apr. 22, 2014), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/04/22/the-unhappy-rise-of-the-
millennial-intern/#7d73bb211328 (last accessed Dec. 1, 2017). 
84 For example, the Second Circuit reasoned that the key issue in assessing 
whether an individual was truly an “unpaid intern,” versus a mislabeled and 
uncompensated employee, is determining which party—the individual or the 
employer—derives the most benefit from the relationship: in other words, whether 
the relationship is genuinely focused on the education and development of the 
individual, or whether the “economic reality” of the situation makes the relationship 
a type of “employment-in-disguise.” See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. 811 
F.3d 528, 536-37 (2d Cir. 2015) (developing the Glatt test to help determine the 
relationship).  
85 Andrew Mark Bennett, Unpaid Internships & The Department of Labor: 
The Impact of Underenforcement of the Fair Labor Standard Act on Equal 
Opportunity, 11 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 293, 302-06 (2011); 
See also Cody Elyse Brookhouser, Whaling on Walling: A Uniform Approach to 
12
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A. The Primary Beneficiary Test  
 
1. The Fourth Circuit86  
 
In McLaughlin v. Ensley, the Fourth Circuit applied what is 
known as the primary beneficiary test.87 The Fourth Circuit developed 
this test upon a cursory analysis of Walling, stating a worker could not 
be an employee where “the principal purpose of the [work] was to 
benefit the person in the employee status.”88  
In McLaughlin, the employer Kirby Ensley was the owner of a 
snack food distribution service.89 The employer employed route men 
who drove his company trucks, restocked the vending machines, and 
sold snack foods to retailers on a commission basis.90 Before Ensley 
hired a new route man, the applicant was required to participate in a 
five-day orientation program.91 During the five-day orientation 
program, the prospective employee was exposed to the tasks they 
would be expected to perform.92 Over those five days, the trainees 
worked a total of fifty to sixty hours, loaded and unloaded delivery 
trucks, restocked Ensley’s vending machines, were given instructions 
on how to drive the trucks, introduced to retailers, taught basic 
                                                                                                                   
Determining Whether Interns are “Employees” Under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 751, 756 (2015).  
86 The Fourth Circuit has repeatedly held “that the general test used to 
determine if an employee is entitled to the protections of the Act is whether the 
employee or the employer is the primary beneficiary of the trainees’ labor.” See 
Wirtz v. Wardlaw, 339 F.2d, 785 (4th Cir. 1964); Isaacson v. Penn Community 
Services, Inc., 450 F.2d 1306 (4th Cir. 1971); McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207 
(4th Cir. 1989). 
87 See Ensley, 877 F.2d at 1209.  
88 See id. (quoting Isaacson v. Penn Cmty. Servs., Inc. 450 F.2d 1306, 1308 
(4th Cir. 1971)). 
89 See id. at 1208.  
90 See id.  
91 See id.  
92 See id.  
13
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vending machine maintenance, and occasionally helped with preparing 
orders.93 Nevertheless, the trainees were not paid for their work in that 
five-day period.94  
The Fourth Circuit looked at who was receiving the benefit of the 
program.95 The court determined Ensley was the one receiving the 
primary benefit from the orientation program. It noted that through the 
program, Ensley had an opportunity to review if potential employees 
would be successful for free.96 The court also stated that one of the 
most important factors evaluated was the nature of the training and 
experience.97 The Fourth Circuit determined Ensley’s training program 
was very limited.98 The individuals did not receive training 
comparable to that which they would receive at a vocational school, 
and the skills they were learning were so job specific that they would 
be unable to transfer to other occupations.99 Thus, Ensley primarily 
benefitted from the training program, not the trainees.100 
 
2. The Sixth Circuit  
 
Like the Fourth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit utilized the primary 
beneficiary test.101 In Solis v. Larelbrook Sanitarium & School, Inc., 
the central question focused on which standard was appropriate to 
determine if students were employees as defined by the FLSA. Here, 
the DOL sued the school alleging it had violated the FLSA’s child 
labor provisions. Solis involved students at a boarding school in 
Tennessee.102 At the boarding school, the students received both 
                                                 
93 See id. 
94 See id. 
95 See id. at 1210.  
96 See id.  
97 See id. 
98 See id. 
99 See id.  
100 See id. 
101 See 642 F.3d 518, 519 (6th Cir. 2011). 
102 See id. 
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tangible and intangible benefits.103 The students received hands-on 
training like that offered in trade and vocational school, while also 
attending academic courses. 104  
The Sixth Circuit ultimately rejected the DOL’s argument that 
their six-factor test was the appropriate standard.105 The court noted 
that the DOL’s six-factor test was rigid and inconsistent with the 
holding in Walling.106 The Sixth Circuit called the six-factor test a 
“poor method for determining employee status in a training or 
educational setting.107 Thus, the court chose to use the primary 
benefits test in determining if students were employees “since the 
test’s generality makes it applicable to many different employee-
trainee relationships.”108 However, the Sixth Circuit modified the 
primary benefit test by adding a factor that considered if the students 
displaced any regular employees and whether the program provided 
students with an educational experience.109  
Ultimately, the court concluded the boarding school students were 
the ones receiving the primary benefit of the school’s training.110 The 
court determined that while the school did receive some benefit from 
the students’ work, the students were also gaining significant 
leadership skills and hands-on experience.111 The court reasoned that 
those skills made them into competitive candidates for trade 
occupations after graduation, ultimately being the primary 
beneficiaries.112 The Sixth Circuit also supported their conclusion by 
noting the students did not displace regular employees and, at times, 
                                                 
103 See id. at 520.  
104 See id. 
105 See id. at 525.  
106 See id.  
107 See id.  
108 See id. at 529; see also Nicole M. Klinger, Will Work for Free: The 
Legality of Unpaid Internships, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN & COM. L. 551 (2016). 
109 See Solis, 642 F.3d 518, 529(6th Cir. 2011). 
110 See id. at 520.  
111 See id. 
112 See id. at 532.  
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disrupted instructors’ time.113 Thus, the court concluded the students at 
the school were not employees under the FLSA.114  
 
B. The Totality of the Circumstances Test 
 
The totality of the circumstances test, unlike the primary 
beneficiary test, looks not just at who is receiving the benefit, but at all 
the factors found in Walling.115 However, unlike the DOL’s test116 
where all factors must be present, courts that use the totality of the 
circumstances test balance factors to determine the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the individuals working relationship.117 
The DOL’s approach of all-or-nothing has not been adopted by any 
circuit courts because courts prefer a more flexible standard.118 
Nevertheless, courts have used the six factors in applying the totality 
of the circumstances test.119 
 
1. Fifth Circuit  
 
The Fifth Circuit utilized the totality of the circumstances test 
when it determined whether trainees of American Airlines were 
employees under the FLSA.120 In Donovan v. American Airlines, 
American Airlines required potential employees to undergo training at 
American's Learning Center in Dallas, Texas, in order to be eligible 
                                                 
113 See id. at 530.  
114 See id. at 532.  
115 See Cody Elyse Brookhouser, Whaling on Walling: A Uniform Approach to 
Determining Whether Interns are “Employees” Under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, 100 IOWA L. REV. 751, 759 (2015). 
116 See Wage & Hour Div. , Fact Sheet #71: Internships Under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR(2010), 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.pdf. 
117 See Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1029 (10th Cir. 1993). 
118 See Solis, 642 F.3d at 525 (rejecting the all-or-nothing approach as too 
rigid); Reich, 992 F.2d at 1026.  
119 See Reich., 992 F.2d at 1026-29.  
120See Donovan v. American Airlines, 686 F.2d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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for certain positions at American.121 However, this training required 
that the trainees give up their other jobs and move to Dallas. Further, 
trainees were not paid for the time spent training, and they were not 
guaranteed employment after completion of the American Airlines 
training program.122 Thus, before beginning training, each trainee 
acknowledged, in writing, that he or she was not an employee during 
training and that being accepted for training was not an offer of 
employment.123  
 For flight attendants, training was forty hours, five days a 
week.124 The training included learning the emergency and safety 
features of each aircraft, as well as learning American Airlines’ 
internal procedures and practices.125 However, the instruction was 
designed to teach employees to work for American and not for other 
airlines.126 In addition, the trainees did not assist in commercial flights 
nor displaced other employees.127 The court believed that the DOL and 
other tests were too stringent of a requirement, and it forced for-profit 
companies to not benefit at all from a training or internship 
program.128 Therefore, to determine whether the trainees of American 
Airlines were employees under the FLSA, the Fifth Circuit used the 
balancing test.129 
The court considered the benefits American Airlines received with 
those the trainee received.130 The court stated: “Although training 
benefits American by providing it with suitable personnel, the trainees 
attend school for their own benefit, to qualify for employment they 
                                                 
121Id. at 268. 
122 Id.  
123 Id. at 269. 
124 Id.  
125 Id.  
126 Id.  
127 Id.  
128 See id. at 271–72  ( the court analyzes Wirtz v. Wardlaw, 339 F.2d 785, 
788 (4th Cir. 1964)).  
129 Id. at 272. 
130 Id. at 272. 
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could not otherwise obtain.”131 The fact that the trainees had to give up 
their jobs and move to Dallas for the training was considered an 
opportunity cost, which the court saw as “a [students] sacrifice to 
attend school. But [the sacrifices are made by] all who seek to learn a 
trade of profession.”132 Thus, through balancing the DOL’s factors and 
the primary benefits tests factors, the Fifth Circuit court was able to 
determine the trainees were not employees under the FLSA.133  
 
2. Tenth Circuit  
 
The Tenth Circuit has also used the totality of the circumstances 
test when determining if an individual qualified as an employee under 
the FLSA.134 The Tenth Circuit used the flexible version of the DOL’s 
six-factor test to determine if participants in a firefighter academy 
were entitled to compensation under the FLSA.135 According to the 
Tenth circuit, all six factors were relevant but not a single factor was 
dispositive.136 
In Reich, trainees attended Parker Fire’s academy for classes, 
tours of the neighborhood, and simulations.137 In addition to the 
classes, the trainees also helped maintain fire trucks and other 
firehouse equipment.138 The Tenth Circuit court assessed the case 
under the totality of the circumstances test and looked at the economic 
reality of the relationship, using the DOL’s six-factors.139 The court 
noted that supporting the strict application of the DOL’s six-factors 
                                                 
131 Id.  
132 Id.  
133 See id. at 272. 
134 Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir. 1993). 
135 Id. at 1023.  
136 Id. at 1027–29.  
137 Id. at 1025. 
138 Id.  
139 Id. at 1027. 
18
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 10
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol13/iss1/10




would be inconsistent with the Walling Supreme Court analysis 
because Walling does not support an all or nothing approach.140 
The Tenth Circuit then weighed the DOL’s six factors.141 First, the 
court determined that the curriculum taught at the academy was 
similar to the educational experience a trainee would receive at any 
firefighting academy.142 The court stated that ‘‘[a] training program 
that emphasizes the prospective employer’s particular policies is 
nonetheless comparable to vocational school if the program teaches 
skills that are fungible within the industry.’’143 Second, the court also 
found that, while trainees were making “financial sacrifices,”144 the 
trainees benefited from the program because they were acquiring skills 
that were transferable within the industry and required to be career 
firefighters.145 Third, the trainees did not displace any current 
employees of the department.146 Fourth, the trainees did not 
immediately benefit the employer and any benefit was “de 
minimis”.147 Fifth, the court looked at the fact that “those who 
successfully completed the course had every reasonable expectation of 
being hired.148 And lastly, the trainees understood that they would not 
be receiving pay during their training.149After balancing the factors 
above, the court determined that five out of six factors favored that the 
trainees were not employees under the FLSA.150 The Fifth Circuit, 
unlike the DOL, required that most factors be present, but it did not 
require that all factors are met because a “single factor cannot carry 
                                                 
140 Id. 
141 See id. at 1027. 
142 Id. at 1027–28. 
143 Id. at 1028. 
144 Id. (the court compared college students as making similar sacrifices). 
145 Id.  
146 Id. at 1029. 
147 Id. at 1028–29. 
148 Id. at 1029. 
149 Id.  
150 Id. at 1028. 
19
: Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Are they Trainees and Not Employees a
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017




the entire weight of an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances . . 
. .”151 
 
C. The Glatt Test 
 
1. Origin of the Glatt Test in the Second Circuit 
 
Recently, in Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, the Second Circuit 
addressed the question of when a trainee is an employee.152 There, 
three interns who worked in a movie production filed a class action 
claiming they should have been categorized as employees and entitled 
to back pay wages under the FLSA.153 The interns worked for nine 
months and were not compensated nor did they receive  academic 
credit.154 The interns did menial office tasks, which included things 
like buying a pillow for the director of the film and bringing him 
tea.155  
 The Second Circuit declined to use the DOL’s test because it was 
too rigid to be consistent with Second Circuit court precedent.156 The 
court stated: “the proper question is whether the intern or the employer 
is the primary beneficiary of the relationship.”157 Thus, the court chose 
to adopt a primary benefits test similar to those of the Fourth and Sixth 
Circuits.158 However, it delineated a list of nonexhaustive 
considerations to be used to determine if an individual is an employee 
under the FLSA.159  
                                                 
151 Id. at 1029. 
152 See 811 F.3d 528, 536–37 (2d Cir. 2015).  
153 Id. at 530.  
154 Id. at 532–33. 
155 Id.  
156 See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 536 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(citing Velez v. Sanches, 693 F.3d 308, 326 (2d Cir. 2012).  
157 Id.  
158 See discussion in Section II.A. 
159 See Glatt, 811 F.3d at 536–37. 
20
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 10
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol13/iss1/10




The court noted that primary benefits tests had three important 
features: (1) the tests focused on the interns and their work, (2) it gave 
the court the flexibility to examine the economic realities between the 
parties, and (3) the test acknowledged that interns’ relationships with 
their employers were analyzed in a different context than the typical 
employer-employee relationship.160 Thus, the non-exhaustive seven-
factors to aid district courts in determining an employment status 
under the FLSA were: 
 
(1) The extent to which the intern and the employer clearly 
understand that there is no expectation of compensation. Any 
promise of compensation, express or implied, suggests that the 
intern is an employee–and vice versa. 
 
(2) The extent to which the internship provides training that 
would be similar to that which would be given in an educational 
environment, including the clinical and other hands-on training 
provided by educational institutions. 
 
(3) The extent to which the internship is tied to the intern’s formal 
education program by integrated coursework or the receipt of 
academic credit. 
 
(4) The extent to which the internship accommodates the intern’s 
academic commitments by corresponding to the academic 
calendar.161 
 
(5) The extent to which the internship’s duration is limited to the 
period in which the internship provides the intern with beneficial 
learning. 
                                                 
160 See id. at 536. 
161 The court did not mention what the academic calendar in this case was. As 
each educational institution can have different academic calendars. Academic 
Calendar, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARY (2017). 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/academic_calendar (last accessed Dec. 
1, 2017).  
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(6) The extent to which the intern’s work complements, rather 
than displaces, the work of paid employees while providing 
significant educational benefits to the intern. 
 
(7) The extent to which the intern and the employer understand 
that the internship is conducted without entitlement to a paid job 
when the internship concludes.162 
 
The seven factors were considerations, but no single factor was 
dispositive.163 The court stated that this test required ‘‘weighing and 
balancing all of the circumstances,’’ where no element was 
‘‘dispositive.’’164 The Second Circuit also noted that besides the seven 
factors, the courts were free to consider any relevant evidence they 
determined would be of aid when making a decision.165 The court 
believed that this approach was the most consistent with Portland 
Terminal166  because the approach focused on “the relationship 
between the internship and the intern’s formal education.”167 
 
 2. Adaptation of the Glatt Test by the Eleventh Circuit  
 
In Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, the Eleventh Circuit adopted 
the Second Circuit’s Glatt test to determine if an intern was an 
employee under the FLSA.168 In Shumann, twenty-five former nurse 
anesthetists were required to participate in 550 clinical cases in order 
to graduate.169 The nurses alleged that they were employees under the 
FLSA and were entitled to compensation because Collier Anesthesia 
                                                 
162 Glatt, 811 F.3d at 536–37. 
163 Id. at 537. 
164 Id. 
165 Id.  
166 See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152–53 (1947) 
167 Glatt, 811 F.3d at 537. 
168 803 F.3d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 2015). 
169 Id.  
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benefited from their work by employing fewer registered nurses.170 In 
addition, the students were required to work longer hours than those 
required by their curriculum, and their services were billed by the 
college.171 The district court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants, finding that the student were not employees under the 
FLSA.172 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found that the Second Circuit’s 
Glatt test was the appropriate modern-day adaptation of the Supreme 
Court’s factors in Walling173.  The Second Circuit’s approach 
effectively determined who was the “primary beneficiary” in an 
internship.174 The court noted that “the best way to [determine the 
primary beneficiary was] to focus on the benefits to the student while 
still considering whether the manner in which the employer 
implement[ed] the internship program [took] unfair advantage of or 
[was] abusive towards the student.”175 
Furthermore, the court added additional guidance on how the 
factors should be applied to the facts of the case, such as that 
employers must have a legitimate reason for scheduling training when 
school is not in session.176 In addition, the Eleventh Circuit stated that 
court “should consider whether the duration of the internship is grossly 
excessive in comparison to the beneficial learning. The court vacated 
the summary judgment for defendants and remanded to the district 
court consistent with the opinion on the use of the Glatt test. 
 
  
                                                 
170 Id. at 1204. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 1212. 
174 Id. at 1203. 
175 Id. at 1211. 
176 Id. at 1213. 
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III. HOLLINS V. REGENCY CORP.  
 
A. Case Background 
 
 Recently the Seventh Circuit was tasked with determining which 
test it would apply to the facts of Hollins v. Regency Corp.177 In 
January 2011, Venitia Hollins enrolled as a full-time cosmetology 
student at Regency.178 Regency operated a state licensed and 
accredited cosmetology school.179 Regency’s stated educational goals 
were “to prepare students to pass the required state cosmetology 
exams and teach them the entry-level skills needed to work in a 
professional salon.”180  
 Regency was governed by state regulations and the National 
Accrediting Commission of Career Arts & Sciences.181 Indiana and 
Illinois state regulations required that Regency’s curriculum include at 
least 1,500 hours of “clock time” and cosmetology-related subjects, 
such as chemical treatment of hair, hair styling, shop management and 
nail technology.182 The regulations also required that the cosmetology 
student received instruction in proper sanitation techniques.183 The 
instruction of the cosmetology topics needed to take the form of both 
classroom and practical learning methods.184  
 Thus, Regency divided its curriculum into three periods: (1) 
workshop phase, (2) rehearsal phase, and (3) performance phase.185 
Regency provides 320 hours of introductory education on various 
                                                 
177 867 F.3d 830, 830 (7th Cir. 2015). 
178 Hollins v. Regency Corp., 144 F. Supp. 3d 990 (N.D. Ill. 2015), aff'd, 867 
F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 2017). 
179 Id. at 991. 
180 Id. at 991. 
181 Id.  
182 Id.  
183 Id. at 992. 
184 Id. 
185 Id.  
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cosmetology subjects.186 In order for students to move from the 
workshop phase to the rehearsal phase, they must pass various written 
and performance-based tests.187 After they pass the workshop phase, 
students are rotated in between the rehearsal and the performance base 
phase.188 For the performance phase, students participated on the 
“performance floor.”189 The performance floor is designed to replicate 
a modern salon, indistinguishable from a fully licensed commercial 
salon.190 Here, customers are charged a fee for student-provided 
services, at rates lower than those of licensed cosmetologist.191  
 Venitia Hollins, alleged that since she spent time on the 
performance floor serving customers and doing administrative and 
cleaning duties, she was entitled to wages under the FLSA.192 Hollins 
claimed janitorial and administrative activities were not part of the 
cosmetology curriculum and did not amount to the experience she 
needed for her certification; therefore, she was entitled to 
compensation.193 The Seventh Circuit, using the Second Circuit’s 
Glatt primary beneficiary test and the totality of the circumstances test 
together (referenced here as the “economic reality test”), determined 
that Venitia Hollins was not an employee under the FLSA.194 The 
Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court when it determined that 
“[t]he economic reality of the relationship between Regency and its 
students is that the students were engaged in their statutorily-mandated 
curriculum to become a licensed cosmetologist while [the students] 
were working on the performance floor.”195 The Seventh Circuit stated 
                                                 
186 Id.  
187 Id. at 993. 
188 Id. at 992.  
189 Id.  
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 993. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Hollins v. Regency Corp., 867 F.3d 830, 830 (7th Cir. 2015). 
195 Hollins, 144 F. Supp. at 1007. 
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that “[this] require[d] us to [] examine[d] the ‘economic reality’ of the 
working relationship.”196 
 
B. Court Analysis 
 
Previously, in Vanskike v. Peters,197 the Seventh Circuit “had 
instructed district courts to assess the [‘] economic reality[’] of the 
relationship between the proffered employee and his alleged 
employer.”198 However, in Hollins the district court revisited the topic, 
and the Seventh Circuit affirmed its decisions.199 Thus, after the 
district court discussed Walling v. Portland Terminal,200 it determined 
that a flexible approach to the factors was consistent with the 
teachings of Walling, and it rejected the DOL’s Fact Sheet#71.201 
Thus, the court found that a mixture of the Glatt factors, the “primary 
beneficiary” test and “the totality of the circumstances,” shed 
significant light on the economic reality of the relationship shared by 
Hollins and the school, Regency.202 The court also noted that no factor 
is determinative, and everything should be considered using the 
totality of the circumstances.203 
Applying the Glatt factors, the court first determined if Hollins 
had an expectation of compensation when she was on the performance 
floor.204 The court stated that Hollins conceded she understood there 
would be no compensation for her time spent on the floor or she would 
get guaranteed employment.205 The court also looked at the 
                                                 
196 Id. at 993. 
197 974 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir.1992) (citing Goldberg v. Whitaker House 
Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33(1961)). 
198 Hollins, 144 F. Supp. at 994.  
199 Hollins, 867 F.3d at 837. 
200 330 U.S. 148, 148 (1947). 
201 Hollins, 144 F. Supp. at 997.  
202 Id. at 998. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 993.  
205 Id. at 998.  
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similarities between the clinical/internship experience and that of 
classwork.206 If the work done in the unpaid position provided a 
learning experience similar to that be given in a formal-educational 
environment, the students were likely not employees.207 Here, the 
court said Hollins was practicing her cosmetology techniques on the 
performance floor, which were things she also did in the classroom.208 
The court concluded that that fact supported the notion that Hollins 
was not an employee.209  
Another factor the court looked at was whether Hollins received 
educational credit. The court noted that a student receiving academic 
credit is a strong indicator that the individual is not an employee under 
the FLSA.210 In this instance, Hollins was receiving academic credit 
by working the performance floor.211 Hollins was obtaining the 1,500 
hours required of practical instruction before taking the license exam, 
and there is no basis to infer Regency would offer salon services to the 
public absent the requirement of the practical instruction requirement 
hours.212 The court also considered if the work was tied to the 
academic calendar,213 and if the length of the internship was limited to 
a period that provide[d] the student with beneficial learning.214 Here 
the court noted that although Hollins had to work on Saturdays, when 
school is not in session, it furthered her educational goals and provided 
a more fulfilling experience.215 The court declared the school had a 
legitimate reason for requiring students to attend work on 
Saturdays.216 Saturdays were the busiest days, and they provided 
                                                 
206 Id. at 999. 
207 Id.  
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 1000. 
211 Id.  
212 Id.  
213 The court did not explain Regency’s academic calendar. 
214 Hollins, 144 F.Supp.3d at 1001–02. 
215 Id. at 1001. 
216 Id. 
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students with a greater supply of customers and a variety of 
experience.217 In addition, the time the students were required to work 
was limited to only the 1,500 hours required for the state certification 
exam.218 
The court also considered if the students’ work complemented, 
rather than displaced, the work of paid employees stating that “[i]f the 
students’ activities displace the trainer’s regular full-time employees, 
then the economic realities might indicate the existence of an 
employee-employer relationship.”219 Here, Hollins did not allege 
employees of Regency were displaced because Regency did not have 
paid cosmetologists.220 In fact, if Regency was not a school, there 
would be no Regency performance floor.221 Hollins also claimed that 
because Regency fees to the public were lower, the students were 
displacing licensed cosmetologists.222 However, the court noted that if  
it were to agree with Hollins, any clinical program in which students 
perform services might displace people operating in the same 
market.223 The court stated that Hollins argument is too “broad [a] 
swat,” and would effectively eliminate all student clinical services.224 
Thus, looking at the evidence the court found that the cosmetology 
students were the primary beneficiaries of the program.225 
After the court considered all the factors, based on the totality of 
the circumstances, it found the economic reality of Hollins was that 
she was a student and was not an employee under the FLSA.226. Thus, 
Hollins was not entitled to compensation.227  
                                                 
217 Id. 
218 Id. at 1002. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. at 1002–03. 
222 Id. at 993.  
223 Id. at 1004. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. 
226 See id. at 1007. 
227 Id. 
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C. The Seventh Circuit’s Hesitation  
 
The Seventh Circuit stated that “[t]he district court was rightly 
skeptical about the utility of this plethora of [‘]factors.[’]”228 And 
although the court ultimately found that Hollins was not an employee 
under the FLSA, the court declined to articulate a specific definitive 
test to determine whether an individual is an employee or an unpaid 
trainee.229 The Seventh Circuit could not make “a one-size-fits-all 
decision” about programs that include practical training or 
internships.230 Thus, the court explicitly stated that the decision in 
Hollins should not be read to mean that all internships/trainings 
involving practical skills are appropriate under the FLSA.231 Rather, 
evaluating such circumstances is on a case-by-case basis.232  
Thus, even after Hollins, the Seventh Circuit has not established a 
clear-cut test to determine an employment relationship between unpaid 
interns/trainees and employers.233 Instead, the court has allowed 
flexibility depending on the relationship at issue, leaving unpaid 
interns and employers with many questions.234  
 
  
                                                 
228 Hollins v. Regency Corp., 867 F.3d 830, 835 (7th Cir. 2017). 




233 See Jeffrey W. Brecher, Hair Today, Gone Tomorrow: Seventh Circuit 
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IV. THE UNPAID INTERNS’ EXPOSURE TO DANGER DUE TO LACK OF 
TITLE VII PROTECTION 
 
A. Brief Title VII Background 
 Usually, if an intern is found not to be an employee under the 
FLSA, they also are not a qualified employee under Title VII.235 
Congress created Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for two 
main purposes: (1) to eliminate discrimination in the workplace, which 
has been fostered in the U.S for many years; and (2) to compensate the 
victims of workplace discrimination.236 With Title VII Congress 
sought to create equal employment opportunities for individuals, 
regardless of race, sex, color, religion, or national origin (“protected 
categories”).237 Title VII made it illegal for an employer to make 
hiring, firing, compensation, or conditions of employment decisions 
based on these protected categories.238  
 In addition, Title VII is not limited to discrimination that leads to 
tangible or economic impact.239 The Supreme Court determined that 
Title VII “strikes at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men 
and women . . . [including when they must] work in a discriminatorily 
hostile or abusive environment.”240 Thus, the Court extended Title VII 
and made the creation and perpetuation of discrimination in a work 
environment an actionable harm.241 The Supreme Court intended to 
decrease workplaces that are “so heavily polluted with discrimination 
as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of 
minority group workers.”242 Thus, Title VII makes an employer 
                                                 
235 Hannah Nicholes, Making the Case for Interns: How the Federal Courts' 
Refusal to Protect Interns Means the Failure of Title VII, 15 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. 
& INTELL. PROP. L. 81 (2014). 
236 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S 405, 417 (1975). 
237 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S 792, 800 (1973). 
238 See id. 
239 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S 775, 786 (1998). 
240 Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. 
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 447 U.S 57, 64 (1986)). 
241 See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2440 (2013). 
242 Id. 
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directly liable for an employee’s unlawful discriminatory harassment 
and vicariously liable when the harasser is the victim’s supervisor.243 
Nevertheless, although Title VII is meant to protect employees 
from work environments that are hostile or discriminatory, it leaves 
unpaid interns without employment related federal protection.244 
Congress circularly defined “employee” under Title VII to mean, “an 
individual employed by an employer.”245 This is a similar definition 
used to define “employee” under the FLSA.246 Thus, if unpaid interns 
are found not to be employees under the FLSA it is likely that the 
courts will also find that students were not employees under Title 
VII.247 As a result, unpaid interns are not shielded by Title VII’s 
protection of discrimination and hostile work environment based on 
sex, race, color, national origin, and religion.248 This lack of protection 
has led to interns having to face challenges in the workplace, like 
sexual harassment, without any way to seek legal relief, such as that 
faced by the intern the case discussed below.249  
 
B. Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Wang v. Phoenix Satellite 
Television US, Inc. 
 
A lack of Title VII protection for interns was evident in the federal 
New York case Wang v. Phoenix Satellite Television, US, Inc.250 
Lihuan Wang was a broadcast journalism master’s degree student for 
Syracuse University.251 Wang obtained an unpaid internship at 
                                                 
243 See Wang v. Phoenix Satellite Television US, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 527, 
529 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
244 See id. 
245 42 U.S.C §2000e(f)(2012).  
246 29 U.S.C § 203(g). 
247 See Wang, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 529 (using a similar test as FLSA cases to 
determine if she was an employee). 
248 See id. 
249 See id. 
250 See id. 
251 Id. 
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Phoenix Media Group, a Hong Kong-based media conglomerate that 
produces television news geared towards Chinese-language 
audiences.252 
During her internship, Wang began to receive unwanted sexual 
attention from a supervisor, Mr. Zhengzhu Liu.253 The attention 
included making sexual comments, trying to forcefully kiss her, and 
asking her to go to his hotel room.254 Previous to this incident, Wang 
and Liu talked about a permanent position and the company’s help to 
obtain a work visa.255 However, after the hotel incident, Liu told Wang 
that the company would not be able to sponsor her.256 Thus, Wang 
sought protection under the New York States Human Rights Law257 
and the New York City Human Rights law258 alleging that she was 
unlawfully subjected to a hostile work environment due to Mr. Liu's 
sexual advances. She further alleged that Phoenix discriminated 
against her based-on gender because Mr. Liu linked future 
employment opportunities based on her agreement to his sexual 
demands and withdrew the opportunity once Wang rejected Mr. Liu’s 
advancements.259 
 Ultimately, the district court for the Southern District of 
New York dismissed Wangs’ case, claiming that Wang was an 
unpaid intern and not an employee under employment 
discrimination statutes.260 Thus, Wang was not entitled to 
                                                 
252 Id. 
253 Id. at 530. 
254 Id. 
255 Id.  
256 Id. 
257 N.Y. Exec. Law §290 (McKinney 2013). 
258 N.Y Civ. Rights Law § 8-101 (2013). 
259 See Wang v. Phoenix Satellite Television US, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 527, 
529 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
260 Although Wang only sued under state law claims the district court 
compared the language of Title VII to determine if an unpaid intern could be offered 
protection under the statutes. See Wang v. Phoenix Satellite Television US, Inc., 976 
F. Supp. 2d 527, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (the court concluded that Title VII did not 
32
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 10
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol13/iss1/10




protection under Title VII or any of New York’s employment 
protecting statutes.261 
  
V. A UNIVERSAL CLEAR STANDARD  
  
To create a more effective test and protection for interns, the 
courts should narrow the number of tests they currently apply and 
choose a single clear standard.262 A clear standard would provide 
employers a clear legal standard when creating their internship 
program. Also, interns would know their rights and make decisions 
with a better understanding of what is required of them and the 
implications of being an intern. Thus, the courts should only look at 
two factors: (1) are all the tasks assigned to the intern associated in 
furtherance of their educational or career goals and is the intern aware 
of how it will further their goals; and (2) does the intern replace any of 
employer’s employees.  
The first factor centers on whether the students are primarily 
benefiting from the relationship. This requirement was clearly 
established by Walling who stated that trainees were not employees 
because trainees are working to serve their own interest.263 
Furthermore, while the courts look at the “totality of the 
circumstances” to determine who benefits, the real focus should be on 
                                                                                                                   
protect interns and neither did New York’s equivalent statutes, leaving Wang 
without a cause of action). 
261 See Wang v. Phoenix Satellite Television US, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 527, 
532 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). However, Wang’s lack of employment protection did not 
mean she did not have other causes of action. She was allowed to proceed with her 
failure-to-hire claim. Kaitlyn E. Fallon, Changes in the legal landscape Regarding 
Interns, VEDDER PRICE PC (June 10, 2015) 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4489b6f9-e46a-49db-bfdd-
791d8de1aff6 (last accessed Dec. 1, 2017). In addition, in response to Wang, New 
York Mayor Bill de Blasio signed an amendment to the New York City Human 
Rights Law on April 15, 2015, adding protections for both paid and unpaid interns. 
Id. 
262 This would likely require a Supreme Court decision or an enactment by 
Congress.  
263 See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947). 
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whether the tasks the intern are doing give them the skills that would 
make him successful in their future career. Thus, although in 
Hollins,264 the court interpreted the benefit analysis correctly it erred 
in deciding that it should be a flexible approach. The court focused on 
the development of the intern’s skills based on their career of 
choice.265 However, it did not look at if all the tasks were meant to 
meet their educational and career goals or if the students were aware 
what skills each task was helping them develop. If Hollins had been 
labeled as a trainee, but only observed and took care of menial tasks, 
like cleaning, it would have been reasonable to consider her an 
employee because she would not have been practicing skills she 
expected would make her successful cosmetologist. In addition, the 
court’s emphasis in Hollins was on the fact that most of the student’s 
time was spent providing services to clients and not conducting menial 
tasks.266 If cosmetology schools treated students as in the example I 
referenced above, the students would not be providing any 
cosmetology services thus weakening the court’s analysis that students 
are trainees in cosmetology schools.  
The second factor to consider is if the employer’s intention of 
having an internship program is to displace the employers’ regular 
full-time employees, whom they would be required by the FLSA to 
provide greater benefits. Walling noted that trainees were not supposed 
to “expedite the company business.”267 This can be determined by 
considering the amount of help, supervision, and internship that the 
employer receives. Thus, the Seventh Circuit ruled incorrectly that the 
students were not displacing employees.268 In Hollins, the trainees 
were doing what a licensed cosmetologist would do and where taking 
away the business and employment from them.269 The school should 
have hired licensed cosmetologist and paired them with a trainee, a 
                                                 
264 See Hollins v. Regency Corp., 144 F.Supp.3d 990, 991 (N.D. IL 2015). 
265 See id. 
266 See id. 
267 See Walling, 330 U.S. at 152. 
268 See Hollins, 144 F.Supp.3d at 991.  
269See id. 
34
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 10
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol13/iss1/10




type of mentorship program. This would ensure the trainee was under 
constant supervision and receiving feedback on their performance. In 
addition, they would not have displaced employment opportunities 
with Regency from licensed cosmetologist. Regency would not be 
making money from the intern’s work. Rather, the money would come 




 In recent years, there has been a bubble of litigation dealing 
with unpaid interns’ relationship with employers and the implications 
of not being labeled as “employees.” These issues include wage and 
hour, discrimination, and hostile work environments. Thus, courts 
have had to juggle with different tests to determine what individuals 
are employees and what individuals are unpaid interns. However, there 
is not any universal test or clear guidance as to what employers should 
do and what unpaid interns should expect. Legislators have started to 
see these issues and have tried to address them.270 Nevertheless, the 
best solution would be a clear two-question universal test focused on 
who primary benefits from the relationship.  Therefore, when they ask: 
“Mirror, mirror on the wall are they interns and not employees at all?” 
The mirror can reflect clear guidance to the expectations of their 
relationship.271 
 
                                                 
270 Kaitlyn E. Fallon, Changes in the legal landscape Regarding Interns, 
VEDDER PRICE PC (June 10, 2015) (New York signing a bill that protects interns 
after the case Wang v. Phoenix Satellite Television US, Inc.). 
271 Note that the test would be evaluating an interns’ employment relationship 
with the employer not evaluating the employers’ internship program as a whole.  
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